Donnellan: “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. TWO USES OF . sentence “ Keith asserted that Smith’s murderer is insane.” To capture the. Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. Due Feb 13, by 10am; Points 5; Submitting a discussion post; Available after Feb 2, at 12am. Keith Donnellan, Joseph Almog, and Paolo Leonardi function is the referential use of definite description, in which the speaker uses it to refer to something.

Author: Malara Nibar
Country: Haiti
Language: English (Spanish)
Genre: Art
Published (Last): 10 October 2006
Pages: 156
PDF File Size: 7.13 Mb
ePub File Size: 17.62 Mb
ISBN: 558-2-62705-393-6
Downloads: 75255
Price: Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader: Tojajar

From the Publisher via CrossRef no proxy jstor. We now run into the teeth of the problem of unwanted ambiguity.

Thus, even if Jones did not murder Smith, we might say, in the original example, that we referred to Jones and said of him that he was insane.

Dissolving Descriptions As noted in the beginning of this article, the Russellian account of descriptions not only offers a quantificational as opposed to a referential account of descriptions, but it packs three different claims into the analysis of descriptions: Foundations and ApplicationsOxford: Definite DescriptionsOxford: That said, in many ways one might think of Donnellan as trying to build on Strawson’s central point about the importance of reference as an act.

To illustrate the problem, consider the following:. Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service.

By applying Gricean principles in this context we have made out that Brown intends to say that there is a unique murderer of Smith and that he is insane.


Nor, of course, could a referential use be associated with wide scope, as Kripke argued forcefully—they simply are not the same phenomenon. Could it be then that determiners serve the purpose of case marking? We take them all.

Keith S. Donnellan, Reference and definite descriptions – PhilPapers

That is, many apparently referential constructions may in fact be quantificational. Desscriptions seems to want to deny that any “statement” is referennce in such cases i. Cambridge University Press, — New Essays on the Foundations refdrence OntologyOxford: We can say that it might have been true under certain circumstances. As Rothchild observes, a similar argument can be made for descriptions embedded in questions here assuming, as did Russell, that possessives are to be analyzed as definite descriptions: Figurative LanguageOxford: Gx So, as in the Ludlow and Segal analysis, the uniqueness claim is not part of what is asserted.

To illustrate the problem, consider the following: The idea is the following: The question is whether each of these constructions must be treated in a different way, or whether it is possible to unify their treatment with the analysis of definite descriptions discussed above.

Keith Donnellan – Wikipedia

For example, the case in which no boys bought any dogs. Readings in the Philosophy of Language. This free variable might then be picked up by some sort of discourse operator as discussed in the previous section. A unified Russellian treatment of the constructions seems possible.

The idea that uniqueness is presupposed is suggested in work by Heimvon FintelElbourne, Rothschildand Schoubye What is asserted is simply an open sentence! Saul Kripke gave a series of three lectures at Princeton University inlater published as Naming and Necessity[4] in which he argued against descriptivism and sketched the causal-historical theory of reference according to which each proper name necessarily designates a particular object and that the identity of the object so designated is determined by the history of the name’s use.



Paul Elbourne – – Linguistics and Philosophy 33 1: It would be natural to understand this as a challenge to Frege. See Everett and Hofweber and French and Wettstein for papers on these general issues, and see Zaltafor a robust defense of the nonexistent object strategy. Disagreement, Implicit Arguments, and Relative Truth. Thesis, Princeton University Department of Philosophy. Searledescription ff. As observed earlier, 46 can be asserted even if there is more than one German airline.

The unwanted necessity objection. Another idea, considered in HeimLudlowand Elbourne is to see how descriptive theories of pronouns fare when embedded within an event-based or situation based theories of conditionals like those articulated by BermanKratzerand Lycan Print Save Cite Email Share.

A1 Indefinites lack quantificational force of their own A2 An indefinite NP in an argument position, however, ends up denoting an individual, because the semantics involves a free function variable that assigns an individual to the restriction predicate.

Consider the following examples.